We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of English auctions. There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm.
1 Introduction Milgrom and Weber (1982) present the standard model of English auctions and propose a symmetric separating equilibrium in which, given a set of bidders who have not yet exited, each acts as if he believes that all other remaining bidders have the same private information he has. Milgrom and Weber's intuition for the optimality of this strategy is based on a bidder's asking at what price he would be unhappy if all remaining opponents simultaneously dropped out. However, under their natural distributional assumptions, a mass exit of this sort is a zero-probability event. As long as at least thee bidders remain in the auction, each knows that he will have an opportunity to re-optimize once he sees one of his opponents exit. This suggests that there might be considerable ßexibility in the strategies that could be used in the early rounds of the auction. While Milgrom and Weber consider only one equilibrium, they describe it as yielding a two-stage procedure in which the n − 2 bidders with the lowest signals Þrst publicly reveal their types, and then the last two bidders engage in a second-price sealed bid auction. We show that this description characterizes all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the English auction in symmetric separating strategies, but that there are inÞnitely many such equilibria because there are inÞnitely many ways that the information revelation portion of the auction can take place.
While it is known that there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in a pure common values English auction (Bikhchandani and Riley, 1991) , we focus on symmetric equilibria in the more general affiliated values framework. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing the equilibrium set. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982) is that yielding the highest exit prices. All equilibria specify identical behavior in the Þnal phase of the auction; i.e., the transaction price is unique. Hence, the multiplicity of equilibria does not affect well-known results ordering standard auctions by expected revenues. However, it has important implications for empirical and experimental research, since one cannot be certain of the interpretation of inframarginal bids.
Model and Result
Our model is identical to Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of symmetric affiliated values English auctions, up to one additional assumption imposed below. A seller holds an auction to sell a single indivisible object to one of n bidders. The value bidder i would receive from the object is u(S, X i , X −i ), where S is a vector of random variables unobserved by bidders, X i ∈ [x, x] is bidder i's private information, and X −i is that of his opponents. The random variables S, X i , X −i are affiliated, with joint distribution F and associated joint density f. We make the following additional continuity assumption: 1
The auction is conducted according to the following rules. The price begins at zero with all bidders "in." Bidders may then exit observably and irreversibly as the price rises continuously and exogenously. The auction ends when only one bidder remains, with this bidder receiving the good and paying the price at which his Þnal opponent quit. If at some point in the auction all remaining bidders quit simultaneously, one of these bidders is selected at random and named the winner at his exit price.
The auction can be viewed in a sequence of phases, beginning in phase zero and entering a new 
A bidder's strategy for phase k is given by a bid function b k (·; y k ), specifying his exit price as a function of the information revealed by prior exits. In the Þnal phase (phase n − 2), assume that all bidders use a strictly increasing bid function b n−2 (·; y n−2 ). 2 Then when X i = x, bidder i chooses
The Þrst-order condition implies the following result.
Lemma. In any symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies, in the final phase of the auction bidders use the bid function
Note that affiliation and Milgrom and Weber's "nondegeneracy assumption" 3 imply that the bid function b n−2 0 (·; y n−2 ) is strictly increasing and that ∂ ∂x π n−2 (x,x; y n−2 ) is nondecreasing in x, ensuring that b n−2 0 (·; y n−2 ) is a best response to itself.
Theorem. Under assumption CONT, the strategies
Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric strictly increasing strategies if and only if each b k 0 (x; y k ) is strictly increasing in x for all x ≥ y n−k and
Proof. (Sufficiency) Suppose all bidders besides i use a strategy b 0 satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii) and consider a phase k < n − 2. Letting π k (x,x; y k ) denote the expected payoff of a bidder with signal x who bids b k 0 (x; y k ) in phase k, suppose for the moment that for all x, y, and
where {y, y k } denotes a feasible realization of Y k+1 given Y k = y k . If bidder i exits in phase k he gets nothing; otherwise he continues to the next phase, where (1) implies that his payoff is
Deviating to a bid b k 0 (x; y k ) < b k 0 (x; y k ) affects i only when he actually exits in phase k, in which case he receives a payoff of zero. Condition (ii) ensures that this is a lower bound on the payoff he would receive by remaining to the next phase. The same argument implies that all reductions in i's bid can only reduce his expected payoff. Deviating to a bid above b k 0 (x; y k ) has no effect on his payoff, since if he reaches phase k + 1 by remaining in the auction past the price b k 0 (x; y k ), (1) ensures that it will be optimal for him to exit immediately when phase k + 1 begins, giving him the payoff of zero that he would have obtained by bidding b k 0 (x; y k ). Hence
This ensures optimality of the bid b k 0 (x; y k ) for phase k, under the assumption that (1) holds. Optimality of the entire bidding strategy b 0 then follows by induction, recalling that ∂ ∂x π n−2 (x,x; y n−2 ) is nondecreasing in x.
(Necessity) Necessity of (i) is immediate from the lemma. To show necessity of (ii), suppose to the contrary that for some k < n − 2 and some y k we have b
0 (·; {x, y k }) must be strictly increasing, in equilibrium all types z ∈ [x, y] exit immediately when phase k + 1 begins. Hence, with positive probability, such a bidder wins the auction at price
The nondegeneracy assumption and affiliation imply that this payoff equals zero for at most one type z. If this payoff is positive for any z, such a type would strictly prefer to raise his bid by a small amount in phase k + 1, since this yields a discrete increase in the probability of winning. If this payoff is negative for all z ∈ [x, y], then a bidder with type sufficiently close to x would have been better off exiting at a price below b k 0 (x, y k ) in phase k, since this would reduce his chance of a proÞtable win continuously while avoiding a discrete loss. Hence (ii) must hold. Finally, to show necessity of (iii), Þrst note that this holds with equality in phase n − 2 by (i). Now suppose that (iii) holds for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2} greater than some k. Then
where the Þrst inequality follows from (ii), the second from the induction hypothesis, and the Þnal equality from assumption CONT. Thus (iii) is true for all k. ¤ When n = 2, the lemma implies that the equilibrium identiÞed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) is the unique symmetric separating equilibrium. However, when n > 2, there is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bidding in each phase is maximal, since condition (iii) of the theorem then holds with equality.
Refinements
We brießy explore other equilibrium concepts that might shrink the equilibrium set. In Milgrom and Weber's equilibrium buyers do not regret their bids even after learning those of their op-ponents (Milgrom, 1981 ). An equilibrium concept that captures this notion is that of posterior implementability (Green and Laffont, 1987; Lopomo, 2000) . It requires that, with probability one, each player's equilibrium action (bid) is a best response to the equilibrium actions (bids) of his opponents. 4 Formally, let B i and B −i denote, respectively, the random variables corresponding to the equilibrium bid of player i and those of his opponents. Let µ denote the equilibrium joint distribution of (B i , B −i , X i , X −i ). Then the equilibrium strategies are posterior optimal (i.e., the equilibrium outcome is posterior implementable) if, for all i and µ-almost every
We focus on the following example in which there are three bidders, with [x, x] = [0, 1]. The value bidder i places on the object is
. Thus, the example ranges from a pure common values model to a pure private values model as the parameter a goes from
) with strict inequality when a > 1 3 . By Theorem 1, the following strategies yield a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any β ∈ (0, 1]:
To verify that the strategies in (2) are posterior optimal, we can ignore (zero-probability) ties in types. So without loss of generality assume x 1 > x 2 > x 3 . In equilibrium, bidder 3 is the Þrst to drop out at a price of b 3 = βx 3 , and later, after bidder 2's subsequent exit at price b 2 = u(x 2 , x 2 , x 3 ), bidder 1 is declared the winner. Suppose the bids of bidders 2 and 3 are known and that bidder 1's intention of staying in the bidding until the price reaches b 1 = u(x 1 , x 1 , x 3 ) is also known. 5 We verify that players' actions remain best responses even with this additional information, noting that knowledge of (b 1 , b 2 , b 3 ) implies knowledge of (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ).
Bidder 1's bid remains a best response, as his valuation u(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) exceeds b 2 . Further, bidder 2's valuation u(x 2 , x 1 , x 3 ) is less than the price b 1 at which he could have won the object, so his bid is a best response. Similarly, the fact that b 1 > u(x 3 , x 1 , x 2 ) implies that 3 could not proÞt from a deviation. Thus all equilibria satisfying (2) are posterior implementable.
A stronger restriction is to weakly undominated strategies. Consider Þrst a pure private values version of our example (a = 1). When β < 1, the symmetric equilibrium in (2) involves use of a (weakly) dominated strategy, since b 0 0 (x) < x. With pure private values, the unique symmetric equilibrium in undominated strategies is that in which b k (x) = x, ∀k. More generally, with β < a ≤ 1, the strategy for the initial phase in (2) is dominated. To see this, suppose that bidders j and h follow the (non-equilibrium) strategies of dropping out at prices p j , p h regardless of their signals.
If p j , p h ∈ (βX i , aX i ), the strategy b 0 0 (X i ) = βX i yields a strictly lower payoff than the strategy b 0 a (X i ) = aX i . Furthermore, because aX i is the smallest possible valuation of bidder i, there are no possible bids by j and h to which b 0 0 (X i ) would be a strictly better response than b 0 a (X i ). It is easily veriÞed, however, that under the restriction β ∈ [a, 1] all symmetric equilibria in (2) involve weakly undominated strategies. Indeed, in the general model the inequality
together with (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 1 characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric, strictly increasing, and weakly undominated strategies. In a pure private values setting 
Eachb k (·; y k ) satisÞes the conditions of the theorem as well as (3). Of course, bidders need not condition on an assumption of equal types among remaining opponents. For example, the following bid functions also yield an equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies:
Hence, except in the case of pure private values, the restriction to weakly undominated strategies leaves a continuum of equilibria.
Discussion
We have shown that Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of English auctions has a continuum of equilibria in symmetric separating strategies. For a seller's choice of auction, this multiplicity of equilibria is inconsequential since the transaction price is identical in all equilibria. However, our results have important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, which often rely on an exact interpretation of bids below the second highest (e.g., Donald and Paarsch, 1996; Paarsch, 1997; Hong and Shum, 1999; Athey and Haile, 2000) . The multiplicity of equilibrium exit patterns consistent with a single distribution of signals suggests one cannot make such an interpretation without a compelling equilibrium selection rule. Experimental studies of English auctions (e.g., Levin, Kagel and Richard, 1996) have likewise implicitly relied on an assumption that the Milgrom-Weber equilibrium provides a unique prediction regarding observed bids. In the case of pure private values auctions, a restriction to weakly undominated strategies provides a justiÞcation for focusing on the Milgrom-Weber equilibrium. Outside the pure private values paradigm, however, a continuum of equilibria remains even with this restriction.
